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9Managing Inter-Legality
Conceptualizing the European Union’s Interactions with
International Investment Law
panos koutrakos
1 introduction
In few areas does inter-legality present legal and policy challenges as starkly as
in the interplay between international investment law and European Union
(EU) law. Consider the facts of the ongoing Micula saga: prior to acceding
to the EU, the Romanian authorities withdrew incentives for new foreign
investments on the ground of incompatibility with EU state aid law. The
investors brought proceedings before an International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Arbitral Tribunal against Romania, arguing
that the withdrawal of such incentives amounted to a violation of the 2002
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Romania and Sweden. Once
awarded $250 million in damages, they brought a successful action before
the Bucharest Tribunal seeking to enforce the award. In the meantime,
Romania appealed unsuccessfully against the award before an ICSID ad
hoc Committee.1 The European Commission decided that the payment of
the compensation awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal would be illegal under
EU law as it would constitute state aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, and
that Romania should recover any compensation it had already paid to the
claimants in implementation of the award.2 The investors challenged this
decision before the General Court of the European Union3 and have also
brought actions before courts of a number of member states (Belgium,
1 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and
S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20 – Decision on annulment.
2 Commission Decision 2015/1470 on State Aid SA. (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN)
implemented by Romania – Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 December 2013 [2015]
OJ L 232/43.
3 Case T-694/15 and Case T-704/15 (pending).
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Luxembourg, the United Kingdom4 and France), as well as the United
States,5 in order to enforce the arbitral award.
The above overview illustrates how the interactions between international
investment law and EU law give rise to legal disputes that emerge in a
variety of procedural settings and in an ever-wider canvas, involving national
and transnational courts and arbitral tribunals, as well as courts in third
states. TheMicula case is but one illustration of the speciﬁc legal challenges
that inter-legality raises in the context of international investment and
EU law.
There are at least three reasons that render this area worth exploring
from the vantage point of inter-legality and its management. First, it touches
upon the most fundamental characteristics of the EU legal order, including
the primacy of its law, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU), the central role of domestic courts in the applica-
tion of EU law and the principle of non-discrimination.
Second, the above issues raised by inter-legality in this area have recently
been brought to sharp relief in a range of legal contexts. In a public enforce-
ment context, and in response to the short shrift that most member states
have given the Commission’s long-standing objection to intra-EU BITs,6 the
Commission initiated proceedings in June 2015 against ﬁve member states and
has requested information from the remaining 21. Another context relates to
the interactions between the Court of Justice and domestic courts: in response
to a reference by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof),
the Court of Justice held in Achmea that the provision of investor–state
settlement dispute (ISDS) in the BIT between Czechoslovakia and the
Netherlands was contrary to EU primary law.7 Finally, there is also the context
of the interactions between member state governments and the Court of
Justice: Belgium requested an Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU on
the compatibility of the arbitration procedure laid down in the Comprehen-
sive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU and its
member states (CETA) with EU primary law.8
Third, the above disputes and the fundamental questions they raise have
emerged with increasing intensity and in a politically charged environment
4 [2017] EWHC 31 (Comm) (www.italaw.com/sites/default/ﬁles/case-documents/italaw8133_6.pdf).
5 See the recent decision of the US Court of Appeal (2nd Cir) www.italaw.com/sites/default/ﬁles/
case-documents/italaw94011.pdf.
6 With the exception of Italy and Ireland, which have terminated their intra-EU BITs.
7 Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v Achmea BV EU:C:2018:158.
8 Opinion 1/17 (pending).
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where investment arbitration is viewed with distinct scepticism, if not outright
hostility, by the wider public.9
The way, therefore, with which these issues have been dealt is not yet
settled. This is an open debate, and seeking to provide answers, let alone to
predict what the ofﬁcial institutional and judicial response would be, is to give
a hostage to fortune. This chapter, instead, will draw on the existing practice
of the EU’s institutions, including its courts, in order to conceptualize differ-
ent approaches to the management of inter-legality in the area. It will articu-
late three such approaches, ranging from conﬂict to integration to harmonious
coexistence.
2 expansion and conflict: seeking precedence
for eu law
Over the years, the European Commission has argued – quite forcefully – that
EU law has rendered intra-EU BITs inapplicable. To that effect, it has
intervened in a number of proceedings before arbitral tribunals, putting
forward various arguments, including the automatic termination of the rele-
vant agreements following accession to the EU by both its parties. The
consistency with which this argument has been made varies. In Eastern
Sugar, for instance, whilst the Czech Republic raised it, the European
Commission put forward submissions that were viewed by the Arbitral Tribu-
nal “for the most part diplomatic and ambiguous” and that suggested that
automatic termination was not advocated.10 In the more recent Micula case,
however, the Commission argued that “the E.U. Treaties superseded the
Sweden–Romania BIT as a result of Romania’s accession to the European
9 This hostility was expressed most vociferously in the context of the now moribund
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It was in response to it that the
Commission has put forward its proposal for an investment court (European Commission,
Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform: Enhancing the right to
regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court). The
debate about the problems of the arbitration system in international investment has given rise
to voluminous literature. See, amongst others, J. Maupin, ‘Transparency in International
Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky’, in A. Bianchi and A. Peters (eds.),
Transparency in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 142;
J. E. Kalicki and A. Joubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor–State Dispute Settlement
System – Journeys for the 21st Century (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2015); M. Waibel et al. (eds.),
The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (The Hague:
Kluwer, 2010).
10 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial
Award, para. 119 (the quote is from para. 120).
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Union, terminating the latter, or, at the very least, rendering Articles 7 and 10
of that BIT inapplicable.”11
As a matter of principle, this objection12 is not surprising. In normative
terms, it draws on the principle of autonomy of EU law that, in the light of
the recent case law of the Court of Justice (e.g., in Opinion 1/0913 and
Opinion 2/13,14 let alone the judgement in Achmea itself, which will be
examined below) has been construed in increasingly broad terms.15 It is also
about the competence of the Union to carry out an investment policy, not
least pursuant to the amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.16 In policy
terms, the EU has been seeking to deﬁne its investment policy in its negoti-
ations with third countries, including the CETA and the Agreements with
Singapore and Vietnam, the negotiation of investment chapters in agreements
with India, Malaysia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia and the negotiation
of standalone agreements with China and Myanmar. This gradually emerging
policy would be buttressed by comprehensive claims about the invalidity of
existing intra-EU BITs.
There is, however, a whiff of maximalism about the argument of automatic
termination of intra-EU BITs. It marginalizes the signiﬁcance of the termin-
ation procedures in BITs. By disregarding the international law nature of the
rules that it deems to be contrary to EU law, the Commission’s argument does
not sit comfortably with the approach that the Court of Justice has adopted in
a similar context. It is recalled that, in its effort to reconcile the pre-existing
international obligations of member states with EU law pursuant to Article 351
TFEU, the Court places considerable emphasis on full compliance with the
international rules on the termination of the relevant treaty concluded by the
member state.17 In doing so, the Court of Justice takes the rule laid down in
11 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack
S.R.L. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20 – Decision on annulment, para. 330
(referring to para. 92 of the Commission’s submission). See also Commission Decision 2015/
1470 [2015] OJ L 232/43 at para. 102. In another recent case, Poland did not make this argument:
Partial Award in PCA Case No. 2013-01 Enkev Beheer B.V. v Poland.
12 See the discussion in A. Reinisch, ‘Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties in Action: The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko
Investment Arbitrations’, (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 157.
13 ECLI:EU:C:2011:123.
14 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
15 For an analysis of the principle in the context of investment law, see S. Hindelang, ‘The
Autonomy of the European Legal Order – EU Constitutional Limits to Investor–State
Arbitration on the Basis of Future EU Investment-Related Agreements’, (2013) 4 European
Yearbook of International Economic Law 187.
16 See P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Hart, 2015), at 30 ff.
17 See, for instance, Case C-478/07 Budvar, ECLI:EU:C:2009:521.
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Article 65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties seriously. Viewed
from this angle, the decision of the Commission to tackle the question of the
compatibility of intra-EU BITs directly by bringing enforcement actions
against certain member states is, in normative terms, preferable.18
The automatic termination argument is also at odds with the Court’s own
approach to succession of treaties as a matter of EU law. It is recalled that only in
relation to GATT 1947 did the Court accept – back in the early 1970s – that the
member states had passed on to the European Economic Community (as it
then was) the rights and obligations they had assumed pursuant to GATT 1947.19
Admittedly, the two cases are not entirely similar, as the latter case was about
whether the Community was bound by an agreement concluded by its member
states. There is, however, an analogy between the two legal contexts insofar as
they tell us how the EU deals with the legal effects of successive international
treaties of potentially overlapping scope. Put differently, at the core of both legal
contexts, the main issue is whether an agreement concluded by the member
states has been subsumed by EU law (in the case of intra-EU BITs rendering
them invalid, whereas in the context of other agreements binding the EU itself ).
It is recalled that, in dealing with the principle of treaty succession, the
Court of Justice has adopted an extremely narrow approach.20
It is only where the EU has assumed “all the powers previously exercised by
the Member States that fall within the convention in question” that the Union
has succeeded the member states.21 This case law suggests that the powers and
obligations laid down in a treaty concluded by the member states would be
subsumed by the Union pursuant to the EU Treaties only if there was a
complete overlap between their provisions.
Is there such an overlap between the intra-EU BITs and the EU Treaties so as
to suggest that the former are rendered invalid by the latter? In his Opinion in
18 The Commission initiated proceedings against Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia
and Sweden in June 2015 whilst it requested information from the remaining 21 member states
(Ireland and Italy have terminated their intra-EU BITs).
19 Joined cases 21–24/72, International Fruit Company, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115.
20 See the analysis in Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 212–219, and R. Schütze, ‘The
“Succession Doctrine” and the European Union’, in A. Arnull et al. (eds.), A Constitutional
Order of States? Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 459.
21 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America (ATAA), ECLI:EU:C:2011:864, para. 63
regarding the Convention on International Civil Aviation. See also C-301/09 Bogiatzi, ECLI:
EU:C:2010:756 about the Convention for the Uniﬁcation of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air; Case C-379/92 Peralta, ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, para. 16 and Case
C-308/06 Intertanko, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, para. 48, about the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973, as supplemented by the Protocol of 17 February
1978; Case C-481/13 Qurbani, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2101 about Geneva Convention of 28 July
1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees.
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Achmea, Advocate General Wathelet argued forcefully and convincingly that
the answer was negative.22 And the Court of Justice in Opinion 2/15 on the
conclusion of the EU–Singapore Free Trade Agreement held that Title IV,
Chapter 4 TFEU on free movement of capital does not confer on the EU
exclusive competence in relation to portfolio investment.23 The invalidity objec-
tion raised in relation to intra-EU BITs is not, therefore, fully substantiated.
There is also a broader problem with the invalidity objection: it appears to
conﬂate the issue of competence with that of compatibility. It does not follow
that the existence or emergence of EU competence would necessarily and
automatically render other rules binding on member states invalid.24
This confusion between competence and compatibility with EU law in cases
where EU law interacts with other international legal regimes is also apparent
in other areas. For instance, the line of reasoning in the judgement of the
Court of Justice in Mox Plant25 is based on the same misguided premise.
The judgement engages in an esoteric and convoluted analysis of what the
conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) signiﬁed for the exercise of the Union’s competence, even though
the wide scope of the duty of cooperation had already been established.26
The above overview illustrates a somewhat maximalist approach to the
interactions between EU law and international investment law that seeks to
establish the precedence of the former on the basis of an exceedingly broad
construction of the Union’s competence. This approach does not engage with
the subtleties of the speciﬁc context within which the Court of Justice has
articulated the unique features of the EU legal order, neither does it explore
any alternatives that would introduce greater tolerance of other international
legal regimes.
We ﬁnd this approach in the recent Achmea judgement that the Court
rendered in March 2018. This is the ﬁrst case where the Court of Justice has
been asked directly to rule on the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law.
The case arose from a reference from the Bundesgerichtshof, before which an
annulment action had been brought against the ﬁnal award by an arbitral
tribunal constituted under the BIT between the Netherlands and
22 Case C-284/16, Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2017:699, paras 179–228. In its judgement, the Court of
Justice did not deal with the issue.
23 ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.
24 See also P. Strik, Shaping the Single European Market in the Field of Foreign Direct
Investment (Oxford: Hart, 2014), 217.
25 Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345.
26 See the criticism in Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 185–186.
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Czechoslovakia. This case is not about a substantive incompatibility between
the intra-EU BIT in question and EU law. In fact, no such argument was put
forward. This case raises, instead, a broader question of a constitutional nature:
does the ISDS mechanism provided for in the Agreement27 and pursuant to
which the arbitral tribunal rendered its award violate three of the main tenets
of EU law, namely the principle of non-discrimination (Article 18 TEU), the
preliminary reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU) and the exclusive juris-
diction of the Court of Justice (Article 344 TFEU)?
In its judgement, the Court held that the arbitration procedure laid down in
the intra-BIT was contrary both to the preliminary reference procedure and
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (it did not examine its
compatibility with the principle of non-discrimination). This conclusion was
reached on the basis of three main considerations. Firstly, as arbitral tribunals
take account of domestic law and international treaties between the contract-
ing parties and given that EU law forms part of both of these sets of rules,
arbitral tribunals may be called on to interpret or apply EU law (including
provisions on the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital).
Secondly, arbitral tribunals may not refer questions about the interpretation
and application of EU law to the Court of Justice because they do not
constitute parts of the judicial system of the contracting member states.
Their decisions, therefore, are not subject to the mechanisms that ensure
the full effectiveness of EU law. Thirdly, the decisions of arbitral tribunals are
not subject to full judicial review by domestic courts, which may not, there-
fore, refer EU law issues pertaining to such decisions to the Court of Justice.
The language in Achmea is couched at a high level of abstraction and the
central thread that underlies the judgement is the principle of autonomy.
Introduced in the early constitutionalizing case law in order to safeguard the
normative features of the then-nascent legal order from challenges from
domestic law,28 autonomy has become prominent in later case law as a shield
from interferences from international law.29 It is on that later case law that
the judgement draws, and in particular the much criticized Opinion 2/13,30
27 Art. 8 of the BIT between the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia.
28 See J. W. van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law: More Is Less?’ in R. A. Wessel and
S. Blockmans (eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence – The EU Legal Order under the
Inﬂuence of International Organisations (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 13.
29 See the overview in J. Odermatt, ‘The Principle of Autonomy: An Adolescent Disease of EU
External Relations Law?’ in M. Cremona (ed.), Structural Principles in EU External Relations
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2018), 291.
30 Opinion 2/13 (ECHR), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. See, amongst others, B. De Witte and Š.
Imamovic, ‘Opinion 2/13 on Accession to the ECHR: Defending the EU Legal Order against a
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where the Court concluded that the draft agreement on the Union’s accession
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was contrary to the
principle of autonomy.
In its construction of the principle, the judgement in Achmea illustrates a
most orthodox reading of the orthodoxy of EU law. This is characterized by a
degree of formalism. Take, for instance, the argument that arbitral tribunals
may rule on the interpretation or application of EU law. This may well be the
case, however in practice the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is conﬁned to
the interpretation and application of the BITs pursuant to which a dispute has
been brought before them, and their approach to EU law matters may not
bind either the EU or the Member States as a matter of EU law. The
judgement in Achmea may appear to suggest that every time an EU law issue
pertains to a dispute before any international tribunal, the autonomy of the
EU legal order would be at stake and the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction would
need to be triggered. The implications of such a maximalist position would be
striking, especially in light of the nuanced approach of the Arbitral Tribunal
itself in Achmea, which had pointed out that “[w]hat the ECJ has is a
monopoly on the ﬁnal and authoritative interpretation of EU law.”31
It follows from the above that the criterion we ﬁnd in the judgement for
ascertaining consistency with EU law (May an EU law issue related to the
dispute be brought before an arbitral tribunal?) is too broad. As such, it
enables the Court to construe the reach of the EU legal order in similarly
broad terms and to articulate an antagonistic relationship with international
investment law. A narrower criterion (May an arbitral award bind a member
state to a given interpretation of EU law?) would provide a more nuanced
picture of the interactions between EU, international and national law. It
would also lead to a different approach to inter-legality: rather than conﬂict, it
would be about managing the coexistence of EU and international investment
law. Such an alternative approach is at least arguable. It was suggested by
Advocate General Wathelet in his Opinion in Achmea (ignored completely by
the Court) and will be examined in Section 4 below. It is also suggested by the
Commission and the Council themselves, albeit in an extra-EU BIT: CETA
includes a domestic law clause that makes it clear that the Investment
Foreign Human Rights Court’, (2015) 40 European Law Review 683; S. Peers, ‘The EU’s
Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’, (2015) 16 German Law Journal
213; and E. Spaventa, ‘A Very Fearful Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the
European Union after Opinion 2/13’, (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law 35.
31 PCA Case No 2008-13, Eureko B.V v Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and
Suspension (26 October 2010), para. 282.
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Tribunal established under its provisions would not bind the parties to any
meaning it may give to domestic law.32 The consistency of this clause with EU
law is the subject matter of the pending request for an Opinion pursuant to
Article 288(11) TFEU.
There is a thread, therefore, that brings together the Commission’s
approach to intra-EU BITs and the judgement in Achmea: it views inter-
legality as a space for conﬂict between EU and international investment
law, as a threat that EU law may only address on the basis of an expansive
reading of what the Court understands the principle of autonomy to be about.
The context within which this approach has been adopted – namely in treaty
relations between member states – is quite speciﬁc: it highlights any potential
conﬂict with EU law more starkly, given the constitutionalized setting within
which relations between member states are regulated. In Achmea, for
instance, we ﬁnd references to the principle of mutual trust to which the
intra-EU BIT provision for arbitration runs counter,33 as well as an effort in
the ﬁnal paragraphs of the judgement to distinguish between intra-EU and
extra-EU agreements.34 The judgement, however, is couched in such abstract
terms that it invites its own misreading. Be that as it may, the following
sections will examine alternative approaches to inter-legality, where conﬂict
may give way to pragmatism.
3 pragmatism and integration: managing the
international obligations of the member states
If we stepped beyond the intra-EU setting examined in the above section, we
ﬁnd another context within which the clash between international investment
and EU law emerges in BITs concluded by member states with third countries
(extra-BITs). The legal position of these agreements became controversial
after the Treaty of Lisbon had entered into force. This was because investment
had been included for the ﬁrst time within the scope of the Common
32 [2017] OJ L 11/23, Art. 8.31(2) CETA: “The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine
the legality of a measure, alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic
law of the disputing Party. For greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure
with this Agreement, the Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of the
disputing Party as a matter of fact. In doing so, the Tribunal shall follow the prevailing
interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or authorities of that Party and any
meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts or the
authorities of that Party.”
33 Case C-284/16 Achmea, paras 34 and 58.
34 Ibid., para. 58,
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Commercial Policy pursuant to Article 207 TFEU. As the EU had been
endowed with express external competence in the area, and given the exclu-
sive nature of this competence,35 the power of the member states to retain
investment agreements appeared to be incompatible with EU law. This was
not an insigniﬁcant matter, given that approximately 1,400 agreements con-
cluded by member states were in force.
And yet the EU did not demand that such agreements be revoked. Instead,
it introduced a set of transitional arrangements that brought the management
and amendment of the BITs that the member states had concluded within the
scope of EU law. Adopted in 2012, Regulation 1219/2012 (the ‘Grandfathering
Regulation’) provides for the maintenance in force and amendment of
existing as well as the negotiation and conclusion of new BITs under certain
conditions.36 It establishes a procedural framework at the centre of which is
the Commission itself. On the one hand, existing agreements are authorized
by the Commission following their notiﬁcation by all the member states.
Such authorization may be granted notwithstanding the Union’s competence
in the area37 and without prejudice to other EU law obligations of the
member states.38 The Commission reviews the notiﬁed agreements in order
to assess whether they are compatible with EU law, they overlap with an
agreement that the Union negotiates or they constitute an obstacle to the
development and implementation of the Union’s investment policies. These
would also constitute grounds for withdrawal of an authorization by the
Commission.
On the other hand, the amendment of an existing BIT or the conclusion of
a new BIT is also subject to authorization following a notiﬁcation by the
member state concerned. Such notiﬁcation39 should be submitted at least ﬁve
months prior to the commencement of the negotiations. This information is
then disseminated to the other member states, and, within three months, the
Commission ascertains whether to authorize the opening of formal negoti-
ations. Such an assessment would depend on whether the opening of negoti-
ations would be in conﬂict with EU law, whether it would be superﬂuous in
the light of imminent negotiations of an EU agreement, whether it is incon-
sistent with the EU’s principles and objectives for external action or whether it
35 Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU.
36 Reg. 1219/2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements
between member states and third countries, [2012] OJ L 351/40.
37 See Preamble 3 and Art. 1 of Reg. 1219/2012.
38 Ibid., Art. 3.
39 The notiﬁcation should cover the provisions to be addressed in the negotiations, the
objectives of the negotiations and any other relevant information.
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constitutes a serious obstacle to the negotiation or conclusion of BITs
with third countries by the EU. All BITs notiﬁed to the Commission are
published annually.40
The Grandfathering Regulation is but an example of member states being
empowered to exercise powers that primary law is deemed to have conferred
on the Union. In fact, the notion of authorizing member states to act in areas
of EU-exclusive competence is intrinsically linked to the notion of exclusivity.
When the Court of Justice held – 33 years prior to the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty – that the Union’s competence in Common Commercial
Policy was exclusive, it also held that member states could act autonomously
“only . . . by virtue of speciﬁc authorisation by the Community.”41 Viewed
from this angle, the approach illustrated by the Grandfathering Regulation is
not novel. If we stepped back even farther, we would also ﬁnd other contexts
where, whilst acting autonomously under international law, member states act
on behalf of the EU. This may be the case in the context of an international
organization that covers an area that falls, even partly, within the Union’s
competence, but whose membership is not open to other international organ-
izations.42 In such instances, whilst the EU may not become a member under
international law, it relies on its member states that are members and are
bound to pursue the Union’s interests in the context of the organization in
question. In doing so, they are subject to rigorous duties that stem from the
duty of cooperation and have been interpreted by the Court in exceedingly
broad terms.43
What the Grandfathering Regulation does is lay down a set of rules and
procedures of considerable scope and intensity in order to manage the inter-
actions between member states and the Commission. It refers not only to the
opening of negotiations and the signature and conclusion of BITs, but also to
the application of such agreements. In the process of the negotiation of a BIT,
for instance, the Commission may require that a member state include any
appropriate clauses and may request to participate in the negotiations. As for
the application of the agreement, the Commission must be kept informed
without undue delay of all meetings under existing BITs and is entitled to
40 For the more recent list, see [2018] OJ C 149/1.
41 Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke, ECLI:EU:C:1976:182, para. 33.
42 See, for instance, the International Labour Organisation.
43 See Case C-45/07, Commission v Greece (IMO), ECLI:EU:C:2009:81 and Opinion 1/13 (Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of the International Child Abduction), ECLI:EU:
C:2014:2303. See M. Cremona, ‘Member States As Trustees of the Union Interest: Participating
in International Agreements on Behalf of the European Union’, in Arnull et al. (eds.), Essays in
Honour of Alan Dashwood, 435, and Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 196–200.
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require that the member state concerned take a particular position. Similarly,
any dispute that may arise about the application of a BIT must be notiﬁed to
the Commission, which may even require that it participate in any settlement
procedure. Its agreement is also required prior to the activation of any dispute
settlement mechanisms included in the BIT by the member state concerned.
In other words, the Grandfathering Regulation does not reserve for the
Commission the role of a distant and neutral assessor. Instead, it enables the
Union’s executive to be quite intrusive in all phases of the negotiation,
conclusion and application of BITs concluded by member states. This role
is viewed as ﬂowing directly from the overall function of the Commission as
the guardian of the EU Treaties. The degree of intensity that characterizes the
regime governing the management of international treaties concluded by
member states illustrates the strong integrating dimension of these rules.
This model of integration does not amount to substituting international rules
binding on member states with EU rules. Instead, it is about managing the
application of international rules within an EU framework on the basis of an
intensely proceduralized set of rules. In essence, therefore, integration in this
case is about the coexistence of international rules that bind the member
states, but not the EU, with EU law. Put differently, the Grandfathering
Regulation is about managing inter-legality in a manner that would preserve
the integrity of the EU legal order without interfering with the formal exist-
ence and application of international law.
There are two main factors that explain the emergence of this model of
managing inter-legality. The ﬁrst is legal and is about the extension of the
Union’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) to cover investment at Lisbon.
Article 207 TFEU refers to foreign direct investment, which is about the
maintenance of lasting and direct links, and does not cover, therefore, port-
folio investment, which is about the movement of private equity for personal
gain and without the element of lasting inﬂuence. When the Treaty of Lisbon
entered into force, however, the scope of the Union’s exclusive competence to
conclude international agreements in the area of investment was shrouded in
uncertainty. On the one hand, the scope of foreign direct investment itself
(which was covered by Article 207 TFEU) was not clear. For instance, would
it cover only the admission of foreign investment and the establishment of
investors, or would it also extend to the post-admission treatment of foreign
investors, including the principle of fair and equitable treatment?44 On the
44 See A. Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
47–61. For a restrictive approach, see M. Krajewski, ‘The Reform of the Common
Commercial Policy’, in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds.), EU Law After Lisbon
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other hand, the Commission was arguing that the Union’s competence in the
area of foreign investment had already become exclusive, as the EU rules on
the free movement of capital, which applied to movement from and to a third
country too, had given rise to implied exclusivity.45 It follows from the above
that the scope of what the Union could do post-Lisbon on the international
scene in the area of investment was contested. This state of uncertainty had
implications for the member states, as it would strengthen their determination
to retain and exercise their power to apply their investment treaties.
The second factor that explains the integration model illustrated by
the Grandfathering Regulation follows from the above, and is practical: the
determination of investment policy may not come about on the basis of a
single policy measure. It requires a careful weighing of various economic,
policy and political considerations and entails a long and complex process that
involves a range of different actors. In other words, the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 and the endowment of the Union with
exclusive competence in certain areas of foreign investment by no means gave
rise to a Union investment policy. Practical exigencies, therefore, would have
rendered the possibility of a member state revoking parts of its BITs in the light
of the Union’s exclusive competence and in anticipation of a Union approach
inconceivable. Investors could not possibly be left in a vacuum, as legal
uncertainty would undermine investor conﬁdence.
The signiﬁcance of the above practical considerations was acknowledged by
the Commission. In a communication it adopted in July 2010, it suggested that
the determination of the Union’s investment policy is a ‘gradual and targeted’
process that requires time and needs to take a number of factors into
account:46 “While it is the Union’s responsibility to promote the European
model and the single market as a destination for foreign investors, . . . it seems
neither feasible nor desirable to replace the investment promotion efforts of
Member States, as long as they ﬁt with the common commercial policy and
remain consistent with EU law.”47
This practical factor suggests that pragmatism was paramount for dealing
with the interactions between the international obligations of the member
states on the one hand, and the emerging policy of the Union on the other
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 292, at 303–304. For a broad approach, see
P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
64–65.
45 COM (2010) 343 ﬁn Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy
(Brussels, 7 July 2010), at 8.
46 Ibid., at 2.
47 Ibid., at 6.
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hand. The central role of pragmatism in the area also emerges clearly in
relation to the legal factor outlined above. This becomes apparent in the
aftermath of Opinion 2/15 on the signing and conclusion of the Free Trade
Agreement between the EU and Singapore.48 In this ruling, the Court of
Justice interpreted the scope of foreign direct investment under
Article 207 TFEU broadly, whereas it held that the TFEU provisions on
movement of capital did not give rise to implied exclusive competence in
the area of portfolio investment.
It is noteworthy that the main question that this division of powers has raised
for policy-makers is in relation to future agreements that the EU negotiates:
should these be concluded as mixed agreements (given that, in addition to
portfolio investment, the Court held in Opinion 2/15 that provisions on ISDS
fall beyond the Union’s exclusive competence)? Or should the investment
provisions be removed from free trade agreements in order to enable the EU
to conclude the latter without the participation of the member states?49
The emphasis of the post-Opinion 2/15 debate is not on the implications of
the ruling for the international obligations that the member states have already
assumed. These are deemed to have been dealt with satisfactorily pursuant to
the model of integration illustrated by the Grandfathering Regulation.
In other words, the clariﬁcation of the legal landscape has not done away
with the pragmatic function of the transitional arrangements already agreed
upon in relation to member states’ extra-EU BITs.
The analysis of the model of integration discussed in this section raises a
further question: does the term ‘integration’ sit comfortably with the mainten-
ance of both the existing agreements and the power of the member states to
amend them? Put differently, does the approach adopted in the Grandfather-
ing Regulation not question the extent to which the management of the
international obligations of the member states have been Europeanized?
The answer to this question is negative on two grounds. First, the intensity
of the procedural duties that the Regulation imposes on national authorities
and the direct involvement of the Commission in the process of application,
amendment and negotiation of the relevant BITs suggest a rigorous legal
context within which international investment law and EU law interact.
Second, the agreements dealt with by the Grandfathering Regulation are
viewed by the Union’s institutions as fully within the EU’s emerging
48 ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.
49 After the writing of this chapter was completed, the agreement with Singapore was split into
two: a trade agreement to which only the EU is a party and an investment protection
agreement that is mixed.
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investment policy. This is illustrated by the Commission’s proposal for the
negotiation of a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settle-
ment of investment disputes that refers to the above agreements expressly.50
4 acceptance and coexistence: ensuring the harmonious
interactions between eu law and intra-eu bits
The analysis has explored two different approaches to the management of
inter-legality in the area of international investment and EU law that emerge
in different contexts. In the context of intra-EU BITs, we ﬁnd an understand-
ing of inter-legality in conﬂictual terms, which is underpinned by a strong
concern for the autonomy of the EU legal order. In the context of extra-EU
BITs, a pragmatic understanding of the limits of EU action prevails and is
translated in a set of rigorous substantive and procedural rules that govern the
coexistence of international and EU law.
It is not, however, context that necessarily dictates the Union’s response. In
fact, a more harmonious construction of inter-legality is possible even in the
context of intra-EU agreements. This was illustrated by the Opinion of
Advocate General Wathelet in Achmea.51 While ignored by the Court, this
Opinion is worth examining, as it articulates a thoughtful understanding of
managing inter-legality in the area. It suggests that the right of investors to rely
upon arbitral tribunals in order to enforce intra-EU BITs is in full compliance
with EU law. The main thrust of his argument is threefold. First, the principle
of non-discrimination is not violated, as intra-EU BITs are similar to
double taxation treaties, which have been viewed by the Court as consistent
with EU law.52 Second, arbitral tribunals established by an intra-EU BIT
meet all the requirements necessary for them to be considered courts or
tribunals in the meaning of Article 267 TFEU53 and, as they are common to
the two member states that are parties to the treaty in question,54 they are
50 COM (2017) 493 ﬁn Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorising the Opening of
Negotiations for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (Brussels, 13 September 2017).
51 Case C-284/16, Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2017:699.
52 Case C-376/03,D, ECLI:EU:C:2005:424. This was a point that was not examined by the Court.
53 The requirements are set out in Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, ECLI:EU:C:1997:413, para. 23,
and have been reafﬁrmed ever since (e.g., Case C-394/11, Belov, ECLI:EU:C:2013:48, para. 38).
54 See Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior, ECLI:EU:C:1997:517, para. 21, where a court
established under an international treaty concluded between the BENELUX countries was
deemed to be in the same position as courts of tribunals in the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU.
Advocate General Wathelet had expressed this view brieﬂy in his Opinion in CJEU, Case
C-567/14, Genentech, ECLI:EU:C:2016:177, footnote 34 (considering arbitral tribunals as
220 Panos Koutrakos
bound by this provision as far as the application and interpretation of EU law
is concerned. Third, the role of arbitral tribunals pursuant to intra-EU BITs
does not violate the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 TFEU, as
they are required to respect the principles of EU law, failing which the
member states would be liable in damages55 and subject to enforcement
actions by the Commission and other member states.56
The Opinion was viewed at the time as “shockingly ﬁrm”57 and “a remark-
able defence of ISDS.”58 From the point of view of inter-legality, the approach
adopted by Advocate General Wathelet illustrates a symbiotic relationship
between intra-BITs and EU law. It understands them as two distinct legal
spheres, the interactions of which need not threaten the functioning of either.
In developing this approach, his line of reasoning is characterized by two main
features. The ﬁrst is a strong realist streak that anchors the Opinion on the
practice of arbitral tribunals set up under intra-EU BITs. This is apparent in
different contexts. Advocate General Wathelet points out that “the systemic
risk which, according to the Commission, intra-EU BITs represent to the
uniformity and effectiveness of EI law is greatly exaggerated”59; he refers to
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) statis-
tics, according to which investors have been successful in only 16.1 per cent of
intra-EU BIT arbitral proceedings over several decades,60 and he points out
that in none of these cases were arbitral tribunals required to review the
validity of EU measures or the compatibility of domestic measures with EU
law.61 Furthermore, he refers to Micula as the single case where an arbitral
award is viewed as contrary to EU law (and even that case he views as
irrelevant as EU law was not applicable, given that Romania had not acceded
to the EU when the arbitration commenced).62
The second feature of the analysis in the Opinion is the avoidance of grand
teleological arguments. This is in stark contrast to the judgement of the Court
courts common to a number of member states for the purposes of Art. 267 TFEU “could help
to ensure the correct and effective implementation of EU law”).
55 Case C-224/01, Köbler, ECLI:EU:C:2003:513.
56 Arts 258 and 259 TFEU.
57 I. Dimitrov, ‘Digesting the AG Wathelet Opinion in Case C-284/16 Slowakische Republik v
Achmea BV. Is It a Trap?’ Available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/10/07/
digesting-ag-wathelet-opinion-case-c-28416-slowakische-republik-v-achmea-bv-trap.
58 A. Carta and L. Ankersmit, ‘AG Wathelet in C-284/16 Achmea: Savind ISDS?’ Available at
https://europeanlawblog.eu/tag/ag-wathelet-in-c-28416-achmea.
59 Para. 44 of the Opinion, and again in para. 45.
60 Para. 44 of the Opinion.
61 Para. 45 of the Opinion.
62 Para. 45 and n49 of the Opinion.
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and the high level of abstraction in which it is couched. Whilst setting out an
open approach to the coexistence of intra-BITs and EU law, the Advocate
General puts forward arguments that are based on the strict and textual
wording of the law. For instance, he argues that Article 344 TFEU does not
support the exclusive jurisdiction argument because it refers to member states
only, and therefore does not cover actions brought by individuals (a point that
was ignored by the Court in its judgement).63 In a similar vein, his construc-
tion of the intra-EU BITs as being in a symbiotic relationship with EU law
draws upon the limited purview of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals that
does not cover the validity of EU measures under EU law. It is also based on
the capacity of EU law to deal with any threats to autonomy that may emerge,
as the structures and principles laid down in the Treaties are sufﬁcient to
absorb any tensions that may arise, such as in the context of the preliminary
reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU) and the principle of state liability.
There is a thread that brings together the approach outlined above and the
position that the Court of Justice took in the Kadi litigation regarding the
application of EU law human rights standards to EU measures adopted
pursuant to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.64 It is
recalled that this line of case law is based on the assumption that the Court
of Justice lacks jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of a UNSC resolution,
even on grounds of compliance with jus cogens, and that therefore:
. . . any judgment given by the Community judicature deciding that a
Community measure intended to give effect to such a resolution is contrary
to a higher rule of law in the Community legal order would not entail any
challenge to the primacy of that resolution in international law.65
The approach set out in Kadi was criticized as ‘inward-looking’ and at odds
with “the self-presentation of the EU as an organization which maintains
particular ﬁdelity to international law and institutions.”66 And yet, the logic
of this approach is based on the premise that the special status of the Treaties
establishing the EU and the autonomy of the EU legal order would not be
63 See also his narrow reading of Opinion 2/13, which had found a violation of Article 344
TFEU in relation to actions brought between member states or by member states against the
EU, but not by individuals: paras 151–152 of the Opinion (with reference to paras 201–214 of
Opinion 2/13).
64 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundations,
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.
65 Ibid., para. 288.
66 G. de Búrca, ‘The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-Evaluation’, in G. de Búrca
and J. H. H. Weiler (eds.), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 105, at 140.
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seen as a threat to the principle of international law and the hierarchies that
this has introduced.67 Put differently, the latter may coexist with the EU legal
order without diluting the unique features of either, especially given the
context within which this approach was adopted and the widely contested
nature of the UN listing rules in question.68 This understanding of the
interactions between public international law and EU law, which underpins
the entire body of the Court’s case law on smart sanctions,69 is also borne out
by the practical implications of Kadi insofar as at no point during the long saga
was the EU forced to ignore the UN measures requiring that member states
freeze the relevant assets.70 The pronouncement of the illegality of the EU
implementing regulations did not, therefore, entail a violation of international
law by the member states.
It is this notion of coexistence that we see in the Opinion in Achmea on the
interactions of international investment law and EU law. The approach
adopted by Advocate General Wathelet may appear somewhat paradoxical:
whilst he acknowledges the dispute settlement regime laid down in intra-EU
BITs as autonomous from and in compliance with the EU legal order, this is
so because the latter is viewed as powerful enough to impose its discipline on
arbitral tribunals. After all, the possibility of state liability for a violation of EU
law is about bringing the conduct of arbitral tribunals into the purview of the
EU legal order. Does this not condition the coexistence that the learned
Advocate General appears to sanction by subjugating one legal regime to
the other?
The answer to this question is negative. After all, we see a similar approach
to the coexistence of intra-EU BITs with EU law in arbitral Tribunals. In
Euram, for instance,71 whilst the Tribunal rejected all the jurisdictional
objections put forward by both the Commission and Slovakia about the
application of the BIT to Austrian investors, it made it clear that it had no
67 See also the analysis in G. Pavlakos and J. Pauwelyn, ‘Principled Monism and the Normative
Conception of Coercion under International Law’, in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.),
Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of
the World (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 317.
68 This point is analysed in Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 223–226.
69 See Case C-548/09 P, Bank Melli Iran v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2011:735, para. 105, and Joined
Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Kadi II, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, para. 67.
70 The point is made in J. Larik, ‘EU Counter-Terrorism and the “Strict Observance” of
International Law: Sewing the Seamless Coat of Compliance’, in E. Herlin-Karnell and
C. Matera (eds.), External Dimension of the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy (2014) CLEER
Working Paper 2014/2 33.
71 European American Investment Bank AG v Slovakia, PCA Case No. 2010-17, Award on
Jurisdiction (22 October 2012), at para. 263.
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power to determine the validity of an act of an EU institution. It also pointed
out that “if a Member State were minded to enforce an arbitral award that
would violate EU law, tools remain in the hands of the EU institutions – and
particularly the ECJ – to ensure a proper application of EU law.”72 We ﬁnd
this approach in Achmea too, where the Arbitral Tribunal refers to its “clear
and ﬁxed limitation on [its] jurisdiction,” which does not extend the power to
rule on alleged breaches of EU law.73 It is this line of reasoning that we see in
the Advocate General’s Opinion in Achmea too.
In any case, whilst understood as two separate legal regimes, ISDSs under
intra-EU BITs and EU law are connected by a factor that they have in
common and is essential to their functioning, namely domestic courts. In
his Opinion, Advocate General Wathelet stresses the role of domestic courts
in the enforcement of arbitral awards and therefore in ensuring that no
incompatibility with EU law would arise. As for their contribution to EU
law, it is not for nothing that they have been described as ‘the powerhouse’ of
the EU legal order.74 After all, the Court of Justice itself refers to them as
“guardians of th[e EU] legal order and the judicial system of the European
Union.”75 Their position in the management of inter-legality will be
examined in the following section.
5 the role of domestic courts
The role of domestic courts emerges as a signiﬁcant component of managing
the symbiotic relationship between international investment protection and
EU law. It is recalled, for instance, that the case in Achmea arose from a
preliminary reference by the German Bundesgerichtshof. After all, it is domes-
tic courts that are often caught in the middle when it comes to the parallel
application of these two legal regimes.
The role of domestic courts is illustrated with striking clarity in the Achmea
case, albeit from two contrasting perspectives. In the judgement, it emerges as
the main reason for rejecting the legality of intra-EU BITs under EU law.
It is their jurisdiction to interpret and apply EU law under Article 19 TEU
that the Court claims to protect, as the binding nature of arbitral awards is
deemed to prevent them from exercising unlimited judicial review and
72 Ibid., para. 264.
73 PCA Case No. 2008-13, Achmea, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (26
October 2010), para. 290.
74 D. Edward, ‘National Courts – The Powerhouse of Community Law’, (2002–2003) 5
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1.
75 Opinion 1/09 (European and Community Patents Courts), ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, para. 66.
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making a reference under Article 267 TFEU.76 There is delicious irony in the
Court’s concern that ISDSs would deprive domestic courts of their jurisdic-
tion to refer, given that the Achmea judgement itself was in response to a
reference by the Bundesgerichtshof. This is not the ﬁrst time that the Court of
Justice has stressed the rights of domestic courts in order to substantiate its own
strong reading of autonomy of EU law. In fact, this is a thread that underpins
the more recent rulings on the interactions between EU and international
law. A case in point is Opinion 1/09 where a draft agreement on a uniﬁed
patent litigation system was found to impinge on the rights of domestic courts
to refer issues of EU law to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU.77
There is no analysis of Article 344 TFEU in the Achmea judgement. Instead,
the Court appears to be a zealous guardian of the jurisdiction of domestic
courts.
At the other end of the spectrum, Advocate General Wathelet suggests that
the existing rules enable domestic courts to play a central role in the manage-
ment of inter-legality. After all, it is they that enforce arbitral awards and, in
the process, may be faced with difﬁcult questions about the relationship
between international investment and EU law. And it is they that may control
the enforcement of such awards on the basis of their compatibility with
public policy.78 In other words, the role with which international investment
law endows domestic courts enables the latter to rely upon EU law and act as
EU law courts, hence safeguarding the autonomy of the EU legal order.
There is a recent case that illustrates quite how domestic courts may assume
this constructive role. This has arisen in the context of the Micula litigation
(which makes it all the more interesting given that, according to Advocate
General Wathelet, Micula is the only case so far suggesting that the enforce-
ment of an arbitral award pursuant to an intra-EU BIT might give rise to a
substantive incompatibility with EU law). Having obtained an arbitral award
in their favour, the claimants sought to enforce it before, amongst others,
English courts. The award was registered in the High Court by means of an
76 See Achmea, paras 36, 50 and 55.
77 Opinion 1/09; see P. Koutrakos, ‘The Court of Justice as the Guardian of National Courts – Or
Not?’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 319.
78 In Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, it was held that a domestic court could
refuse to enforce an arbitral award on public policy grounds, including compliance with the
EU’s competition and state aid rules. This public policy exception is allowed under
international rules governing investment arbitration (Art. V (2)(b) of the 1958 Convention for
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards), but not all of them (Art. 53(1)
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention).
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Order pursuant to the domestic law implementing the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention in the
United Kingdom.79 The Order was challenged by the Romanian Govern-
ment, supported by the Commission, on EU law grounds.
In January 2017, the High Court rejected the Romanian appeal, but granted
a stay of enforcement proceedings pending the resolution by the General
Court (the ﬁrst-instance court of the EU) of the annulment action against the
Commission’s Decision that had found the enforcement of the award to
constitute payment of unlawful state aid.80 This decision was based on a
distinction between registration and enforcement of the arbitral award: while
necessary under domestic law implementing ICSID, registration did not
amount to enforcement and could not, therefore, give rise to the risk of a
conﬂict between decisions of domestic and EU institutions. This was not the
case with the enforcement of the award, as it hinged on the determination of
issues pending before the EU courts. Mr Justice Blair equated the award,
following its registration under English law, to a ﬁnal domestic judgement.
As domestic courts are bound by EU law and the duty of cooperation, the
High Court
. . . cannot therefore proceed to enforce the judgment consequent on regis-
tration of the Award in circumstances in which the Commission has pro-
hibited Romania from making any payment under the Award to the
claimants because in doing so, the court would, in effect, be acting unlaw-
fully. This does not (in the court’s view) create a conﬂict with the inter-
national obligations of the UK as contained in the 1966 Arbitration Act
implementing the ICSID Convention in UK law, because a purely domestic
judgment would be subject to the same limitation.81
This is an elegant and deeply pragmatic approach: on the one hand, it seeks to
comply with EU law and take seriously the obligations under which domestic
courts function; on the other hand, it is faithful to the letter of the inter-
national commitments assumed by the United Kingdom in the context of
ICSID. This is by no means the only example of a domestic court seeking to
reconcile the obligations that result from different supranational legal regimes,
neither is international investment protection and EU law the only case where
domestic courts are called upon to engage in this at times delicate exercise.
Another case in point is the position of domestic courts in the area of asylum
79 Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966.
80 After the writing of this chapter was completed, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgement
([2018] EWCA Civ 1801) and found its conclusion “pragmatic” and “principled” (para. 249).
81 Ibid., para. 132.
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protection and in the light of the ECHR and EU law.82 This is an area where
two at ﬁrst sight irreconcilable strands of case law have emerged. On the one
hand, the Court of Justice has interpreted the principle of mutual conﬁdence,
which is the very foundation of the Dublin Regulation that governs asylum
applications,83 broadly and would only allow deviations in the light of systemic
deﬁciencies, a term that it has construed narrowly.84 On the other hand, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) appeared to prescribe a consider-
ably lower threshold, as it required “a thorough and individualized examin-
ation of the situation of the person concerned” in the context of transfers
under the Dublin Regulation.85 In doing so, the ECtHR did not refer to the
strict approach to exceptions from the principle of mutual trust adopted by the
Court of Justice in Case C-394/12, Abdullahi. How is this circle to be squared?
English courts have been trying to square this circle by reading both lines of
case law narrowly and within their speciﬁc factual and legal contexts.86 In
doing so, they show acute awareness of the need to comply with the inter-
national obligations assumed by the state whilst bringing any differences that
emerge from parallel developments of international case law under different
legal regimes.
The examples mentioned above illustrate the comity that domestic courts
may show in order to manage compliance with international obligations that
may appear to be, at ﬁrst sight, irreconcilable. Whilst comity by international
and transnational tribunals is essential for the tensions between different legal
regimes to be managed effectively without compromising the integrity of the
respective sets of rules,87 it is also necessary for the function of domestic courts.
After all, had the Bundesgerichtshof declined to refer in Achmea and had the
High Court refused to stay proceedings in Micula, the challenges of the
82 On the challenges of inter-legality and human rights protection, see Chapter 14.
83 Regulation 343/2003 [2003] OJ L 50/1.
84 See Case C-411/10, NS, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, paras 80–86; Case C-4/11, Puid, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:740, para. 30, and Abdullahi, para 60.
85 Tarakhel v Switzerland, Application No. 29217/12, 4 November 2014, para. 104.
86 See MS, NA, SG v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1095
(Admin) paras 137–138, and R (Yosief Weldegaber) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2015] UKUT 70(IAC), para. 15. See also the Supreme Court’s judgement in EM
(Eritrea) [2014] UKSC 12, where the CJEU’s judgement in Abdullahi is not taken into account,
even though it had been rendered two months earlier.
87 See P. Koutrakos, ‘The Relevance of EU Law for Arbitral Tribunals: (Not) Managing the
Lingering Tension’, (2016) 17 Journal of World Investment and Trade 873. For comity in
relation to the role of the Court of Justice, see A. Skordas, ‘Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit as
Comity and the Disquiet of Neoformalism: A Response to Jan Klabbers’, in P. Koutrakos (ed.),
European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2011), 115.
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symbiosis between intra-EU BITs and EU law would have been felt
more acutely. Similarly, had the English courts become more creative and
selective in ensuring compliance with ECHR and EU obligations, the appli-
cation of the Dublin Regulation would have been undermined and the
ECtHR and the Court of Justice would have been put in a difﬁcult position.
This is, after all, yet another practical reason that underlines the role of
domestic courts in the functioning of inter-legality: they give the transnational
courts both the opportunity and space to shape the interactions between their
respective legal orders.
6 conclusion
This chapter examined an area that is still evolving. The interactions between
international investment law and EU law give rise to challenges that are yet to
be dealt with fully and are currently under review by both domestic courts and
the courts of the EU. Drawing on recent policy and judicial practice, the
analysis here conceptualized three possible approaches to the interactions
between these areas of law. Ranging from conﬂict to integration to harmoni-
ous coexistence, these approaches emerge in different contexts and are still
under development.
Their analysis raises three main points. First, there are no hard and fast rules
as to what inter-legality entails in different areas of interacting legal regimes. In
the ﬁeld covered in this chapter, different facets of these interactions give rise
to different challenges, and their management depends on, amongst others,
the legal, political and policy circumstances that may prevail at the time and
therefore give rise to context-speciﬁc answers. There is, in other words, a
certain ﬂuidity that characterizes what inter-legality means in practice, and
this has consequences for our effort to articulate general rules about how best
to deal with it.
Second, the management of inter-legality may entail reliance upon strik-
ingly contrasting approaches. Principled objection and pragmatic coexistence
may offer different – albeit parallel – ways of tackling the challenges of inter-
legality. The well-documented quest by certain EU institutions for broadening
the Union’s competence both in law and in fact does not rule out a more
conciliatory approach to the ways in which EU law interacts with inter-
national investment law on the basis of political constraints and practical
considerations.
Third, while this chapter suggested subtler ways of achieving coexistence
between the two sets of rules on the basis of mechanisms of mutual accom-
modation that would not undermine the fundamental features of either, to
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strive for harmonious coexistence is to make a leap of faith. It is to assume that
the main actors in each legal regime would show comity and avoid tensions
that would challenge the limits of each other’s authority. In his approach in
Achmea, for instance, Advocate General Wathelet assumes that arbitral tribu-
nals would be willing to play the role that he envisages for them in the context
of the application of Article 267 TFEU. He also assumes that, just because
there has not been a major substantive clash between intra-EU BITs and EU
law, there would not be one in the future. No such leap of faith was envisaged
by the Court of Justice, where even the theoretical possibility of a clash would
render the coexistence of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and EU law
mechanisms intolerable. Put differently, the notion of harmonious coexist-
ence requires a shared understanding of how best to manage interacting sets of
rules. And this may not always be taken for granted.
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